


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THE  
POLITICAL ECONOMY  
OF  
RHODESIA

*by*  
G. ARRIGHI

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1967

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## PREFACE

Sections II to VII of this study were completed in March 1965 and the introduction (section I) was added few months later to counteract methodological objections raised by some colleagues at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury. The factual material was almost entirely drawn from standard works on Rhodesia, my contribution being in the utilization of such material in an analytical framework seldom applied in discussions of the Rhodesian social system. This framework is based on the Marxist categories of economic base, class structure and superstructure.

The well known developments that have occurred in Rhodesia since the time of writing did not make me feel that the paper ought to be altered in any way. If anything, these developments have added value to the analysis which can readily provide a framework for understanding the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the failure of sanctions. This I have tried to show in an article published in the *New Left Review* which also contained an abridged version of this monograph.<sup>1</sup>

Though recent developments have not impinged on the analysis, new factual material, collected in the course of further research, has revealed shortcomings of some of the assumptions adopted here. For example, of the two assumptions concerning the introduction of the plough, discussed in footnote 7 section IV, the one which shows lesser "internal consistency", and which I therefore discarded, happens to be historically more accurate. In general I have come to realize complexities of the process of proletarianization of the peasantry which are not clearly brought out in the present study. However, I have preferred to leave the analysis as it stands. The new material collected is not inconsistent with the conclusions reached here and though some assumptions may have to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "The Political Economy of Rhodesia" in *New Left Review* no. 39 (Oct.-Nov. 1966), pp. 35-65. Recent political developments are discussed in the last section of the article (pp. 57-65).

be changed, the analytical framework remains valid. As the application of such framework represents the main purpose of the study, I decided not to complicate unnecessarily the argument with lengthy discussions of non-crucial assumptions. As argued in the introduction some naivety in the assumptions may be legitimate.

I would like to thank my former colleagues at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland who commented on an earlier draft. I am particularly grateful to Dr. J. Van Velsen, Professor J. K. Mitchell, Mr. R. W. M. Johnson, Mr. T. R. Curtin and professor W. L. Taylor, for encouragement and critical remarks which prompted me to write the introduction and many of the longer footnotes. Responsibility for the views expressed remains my own.

*University College, Dar es Salaam.*

G. ARRIGHI

March 1967.

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# I

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold. In the first place it attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the forces which have shaped the Rhodesian social system as we observe it today. In the second place the analysis is meant to clarify certain methodological issues connected with interdisciplinary relations within social science. As G. Myrdal has pointed out "in reality there is . . . no distinction between facts corresponding to our traditional scholastic division of social science into separate disciplines. A realistic analysis of problems can never stop at such lines of division. The distinction between factors that are "economic" and those that are "non-economic" is, indeed, a useless and nonsensical device from the point of view of logic, and should be replaced by a distinction between "relevant" and "irrelevant" factors, or "more relevant" and "less relevant".<sup>1</sup>

Which of the two purposes is the "real" purpose is something to be determined entirely by the interests of the reader. In fact those who are merely interested in the analysis of the factual material may omit reading this introduction.

In sections 2 to 7 the interaction of economic and political factors is discussed. It will probably help the reader to think of the analysis as made up of three parts, i.e. part one, consisting of sections 2 and 3, part two of section 4, and part three of sections 5 and 6. Part one and three are symmetrical: a certain *economic base*<sup>2</sup> is related to the co-existing set of socio-political events and attitudes observable in the social system, the economic base being different in the two cases. Part 2 constitutes the link between the two economic bases in the sense that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (1963), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of economic base will become more concrete in the following sections. For the time being we have to define it in very abstract terms as the relations among groups within the social system which arise in connection with the distribution of their aggregate product, and with the control over the means of production.

it explains how, during World War II and the post war period, a series of external stimulants set up a cumulative process of development which radically altered the economic structure of the Rhodesian social system.

It should, therefore, be clear that the approach is not historical; rather the analysis is an exercise in comparative statics. The method underlying the discussion may puzzle social scientists in many respects. There are two main objections which are likely to be raised: (a) though the coexistence of economic base and socio-political events and attitudes is shown, their causal nexus either is not proved or it rests on the unrealistic assumption that each class behaves in a purely rational way i.e. according to a sort of "master plan".<sup>3</sup> This criticism will be referred to as the objection of *superficiality*. (b) The second likely objection is *definitional*. If we ignore the conventional lines of division corresponding to the separate disciplines into which social science has been divided, we forego the "division of labour" among social scientists and the ensuing specialization.

The awareness of these objections has induced me to begin with a discussion aimed at clarifying certain problems of method connected with the analysis developed in the paper.

The following discussion proceeds in two stages. At first different ways of looking at interdisciplinary relations are examined as an introduction to the second stage where an attempt is made to meet the "superficiality" and the "definitional" objection.<sup>4</sup>

### 1. *Economic and Extra-economic Factors*

What follows refers to economics but, as far as I know, can also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to other social sciences. The fact that "economic" and "extra-economic" factors have been conceptually distinguished in orthodox economics does not in general mean that economic models have excluded extra-economic factors. In general we may distinguish three possible approaches to interdisciplinary relations.

<sup>3</sup> No such assumption is needed since, as argued later on, the mechanisms whereby economic base and related socio-political factors are brought into conformity is irrelevant from the standpoint of this analysis.

<sup>4</sup> The effectiveness of this discussion in counteracting these objections depends, of course, on the extent to which they rest on a misunderstanding about the purpose and limitations of the present analysis rather than on the "Sociology of Social Scientists". For an extensive discussion on "The Social Conditioning of Economic Science" see chapter 7 of O. Lange, *Political Economy*, vol. I (1963); See also M. Bronfenbrenner, "Notes on Marxian Economics in the U.S.", *The American Economic Review*, Dec. '64; J. K. Galbraith, chapter 13 of *The Affluent Society* (1958).

(a) A first approach attempts to integrate social sciences by transforming them into branches of praxiology. The different disciplines then become special cases of a more general theory. We may single out two examples of this approach. One is what has been called the "Economic Approach to Politics" which leads to a "Theory of Economic and Political Choices".<sup>5</sup> A second example is represented by those works which try to adapt formal sciences to suit problems typical of social science in general.<sup>6</sup> A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this type of approach is beyond the scope of this paper. Since very little is to be gained by contrasting it with the method here employed we shall disregard it in the following discussion.

(b) A second possible way of dealing with interdisciplinary problems is that generally accepted by orthodox economists. Economic and extra-economic variables are both included in economic models but, while the former are treated exogenously or endogenously, the latter appear exclusively as exogenous factors. In other words no extra-economic event (for example a war or a cold war, government policies, etc.) is explained by the model, though some of them might help to explain what are defined as economic variables. An alternative and more common approach (which cannot be clearly distinguished from that just mentioned) is to regard the parameters in the model as determined by extra-economic factors while all the variables are "economic". These models have become increasingly popular as the attempts to build a theory of universal validity (based on the postulate of the maximization of the utility index) have fallen in the background of orthodox economic theory.<sup>7</sup> Among the many examples of this approach, two are singled out for future examination.<sup>8</sup> They are Kaldor's theory of capi-

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Duncan Black, "The Unity of Political and Economic Science", in *The Economic Journal*, September 1950; see also J. M. Buchanan, "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market", in *The Journal of Political Economy*, August 1954; G. Tullock, "Problems of Majority Voting", in *The Journal of Political Economy*, December 1959; B. Leoni, "The Economic Approach to Politics", in *Il Politico*, September 1961.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. K. J. Arrow, "Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences", in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences - Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, 1952; H. A. Simon, *Models of Man* (1957); see also M. Shubik (ed.), *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behaviour* (1954).

<sup>7</sup> The necessity to reduce the universality of economic propositions in order to increase their operational meaningfulness has been discussed by A. G. Papandreou (cf. "Economics and the Social Sciences" in *The Economic Journal*, December 1950). The procedure indicated to achieve that aims is to derive from other social sciences tentatively valid hypotheses which will impose restrictions upon the relations among economic variables.

<sup>8</sup> See *infra*.

talist economic growth and the concept of government employed in economics.

In Kaldor's theory the possibility of a self generating progress in capitalist economics depends heavily on "entrepreneurial pressures" i.e. on the "capitalists" desire to expand. "It is the economy in which business men are reckless and speculative, where expectations are highly volatile, but with an underlying bias towards optimism, where high and growing profits are projected into the future and lead to the hasty adoption of "unsound" projects involving overexpansion, which is likely to show a higher rate of progress over long periods."<sup>9</sup> In other words the long run rate of growth is a function of what has been called the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs. These "animal spirits" in turn, are thought of, in Kaldor's model, as an extra-economic factor,<sup>10</sup> and as such exogenously determined though the assumption of their endogenous invariancy is crucial for the validity of the whole model.

A second example of the approach in question is the way in which government policies are conceived by orthodox economists. This is a very important special case since it concerns the whole of normative economics. The controversy on this point between marxist and orthodox economists is well known and need not to be reported here.<sup>11</sup> It suffices to say that the government is usually assumed to be a sort of neutral body whose aims are independent from the economic base of the social system i.e. they are exogenously determined in economic theories.

(c) The third type of approach is to build models which include as endogenous elements both economic and extra-economic factors. This approach is rather exceptional among orthodox economists and has been developed mainly within the marxist tradition.<sup>12</sup> The theoretical framework applied in this paper exemplifies the marxist model of social

<sup>9</sup> Cf. "The Relation of Economic Growth and Cyclical Fluctuations", in *The Economic Journal*, March 1954.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. N. Kaldor, *Essays on Economic Stability and Growth* (1960), pp. 236-238.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. for example L. R. Klein, *The Keynesian Revolution* (1952), pp. 183-186.

<sup>12</sup> This is generally true of theories concerning society as a whole and of normative economics in particular. Myrdal is one of the exceptions but only within certain limits. Though he is clearly aware of the process of circular causation between economic and extra-economic factors, he seems, in my opinion, to ignore it when he comes to the normative side of his analysis, for example in a recent work on the American economy (see *Challenge to Affluence*, 1963). Kelecki developed a theory of a political trade cycle where government policies are endogenously treated (cf. "Political Aspects of Full Employment", in *The Political Quarterly*, 1943), but it would be incorrect to include Kalecki in the economic orthodoxy.

development in antagonistic formations.<sup>13</sup> We shall see, for example, that with the development of productive forces (section 4) the production relations alter to conform with them (emergence of a peasant-workers class and of a manufacturing capitalist class: see section 5). A tendency thus evolves for the superstructure to conform with the production relations (section 6) but the process is being interrupted because of the resistance of those classes who owe their economic and social position to the superstructure of the existing social formation. This lack of adjustment between economic base and superstructure in turn prevents the further development of productive forces.

What has been said about the two different approaches to interdisciplinary relations will now be summed up diagrammatically. Let an arrow denote a cause-effect relationship; capital letters in circles, variables; and small letters in squares, parameters or sets of parameters and the form of the function. Thus  $(X_1) \rightarrow [a] \rightarrow (X_2)$  means that  $X_2$  is a function of  $X_1$  (the independent variable), the form of the function being specified by  $a$ . Furthermore,  $X_1, X_2 \dots X_i$  represent "economic" variables whereas  $Y_1, Y_2 \dots Y_j$  represent "extra-economic" variables. Then models  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  (see fig. I) correspond to the approach which makes all extra-economic factors exogenously determined.




Fig. I

<sup>13</sup> By social formation or social system it is here understood the economic base and the superstructure taken together. For an excellent discussion of the theory of development in antagonistic formations, see Lange, *op. cit.*, chapter 2 and M. Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, especially chapter I.

In models of type  $A_1$  some of the exogenous variables are extra-economic factors but all endogenous variables are "economic".

In models of type  $A_2$  all variables (exogenous and endogenous) are "economic" and the role played by extra-economic factors are reflected in the parameters. Models of type B, on the other hand, include both economic and extra-economic factors as endogenous variables. In the following discussion it will be convenient to use the term "Models of type A" and "Models of type B" to designate the corresponding approaches to interdisciplinary relations.

## 2. Naivety in Social Science

Let us now outline some of the advantages and disadvantages of models of type A and B. Models of type A have their main *raison d'être* in the undisputable fact that, through "division of labour" among social scientists, they enhance their specialization. The lines of division, however, are to a large extent arbitrary and rest on convention as witnessed by such definitions as "Sociology is what the sociologists do". It has therefore to be expected that the degree of usefulness of the convention and the extent to which it becomes misleading depend on the problem under investigation. In other words, we assume that whatever factor is classified beyond those conventional lines does not interact with, though it may influence, what is within them, and whether this assumption is reasonable and empirically valid depends on the particular subject of the analysis. In most cases the assumption is undoubtedly useful but at times it apparently becomes just a convenient device for eliminating possible inconsistencies in the results of the analysis. Let us examine, for example, the above mentioned Kaldorian theory of growth. As we saw the capitalists' willingness to exert pressure onto the full-employment ceiling i.e. their "animal spirits", play a crucial part in determining the "steady" rate of growth. This factor is however introduced in the model exogenously (presumably because it is an extra-economic factor) and its determination ignored almost completely.<sup>14</sup> The procedure is suspect. Even though models of the Kaldorian type have served the important purpose of showing the logical relationships that must exist between different macro-economic aggregates if an economy is to

<sup>14</sup> This characteristic is common to Neo-Classical and Neo-Keynesian models. In fairness to Mr. Kaldor it must be said that he advocates "some kind of integration of economics and sociology" (*Essays*, p. 238) to investigate the matter. However since he discards, on rather shaky grounds, the circular causation of economic and social factors (p. 236), it is not clear what he has in mind.

grow smoothly, they may become internally inconsistent when the convenient device of resorting to exogenously determined "extra-economic" factors is abandoned. K. W. Rothschild has, for example, already pointed out that when "we deal with periods stretching over several years or even decades, many of the "given relationships" that were taken over from short-period economics can no longer be regarded as "given". They are moulded by other economic and so-called 'extra-economic' influences which are themselves essential parts of the long-term development process. There must be . . . a greater readiness to admit these "disturbing" factors into the discipline."<sup>15</sup> For example, if the entrepreneurs' "animal spirits" are influenced by some of the variables of the model (directly or indirectly) so that, let us assume, they dwindle as growth proceeds the results may be altered radically. Suppose that the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony in the economy influences the "animal spirits" and that the structure of production tends (endogenously) to become increasingly oligopolistic as growth proceeds.<sup>16</sup> If these assumptions are correct (something to be determined empirically) a stationary state rather than a steady state of growth may represent the dynamic equilibrium of a capitalist system. Thus we have an example of what may be lost by stopping economic analysis at conventional (and convenient) lines of division.

A different example is that provided by normative economics at macro-level. The government is conceived of as a sort of neutral body (neutral with regard to class interests) whose policies are, or should be determined according to a conventionally defined "economic rationality". This unrealistic assumption is the consequence of the lack of models embodying government policies as an endogenous factor. The purpose of this paper is to give an example of such models since it is only by making government policies endogenous that an insight into the built-in stability<sup>17</sup> of the Rhodesian social system can be obtained. Though the analysis implicitly shows how certain legislation and policies constitute a brake on Rhodesian economic development, it also shows

<sup>15</sup> "The Limitations of Economic Growth Models: Critical Remarks on Some Aspects of Mr. Kaldor's Model", in *Kyklos*, vol. XII (1959), pp. 567-588.

<sup>16</sup> A priori arguments and empirical evidence which justify the second statement in the sentence can be found in, among others, J. Steindl, *Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism* (1952); P. Sylos Labini, *Oligopoly and Technical Progress* (1962).

<sup>17</sup> The stability referred to here is, in technical terms, *local stability*. That is it concerns small and gradual changes and not sufficiently strong stimulants which would bring about the conformity of the superstructure with the productive forces of the economic base.

that such legislation and policies have their roots in the economic base. It follows that policy recommendations on "economic" grounds to repeal the Land Apportionment and the Industrial Conciliation Acts, or to increase expenditures on African education and training, or to provide African agriculture with overhead capital in order to increase its productivity, as necessary conditions to promote economic development<sup>18</sup> miss the connection between economic base and superstructure, thus failing to realise all the "qualifications" attached to the government's desire for economic growth. As pointed out by Lange, when the superstructure does not conform with the underlying productive forces, Political Economy may have to limit its role to the passive observation of the spontaneous economic process.<sup>19</sup> If such a position is unacceptable either the economist identifies himself with the established order or he becomes naive as witnessed by the policy recommendations mentioned above.

To be sure I am not here condemning naivety in social sciences in an absolute sense. Devons and Gluckman<sup>20</sup> have shown, with regard to research at the *micro-level*, the *necessity* of being naive. "Since everyone must restrict his field of analysis, . . . there is a *duty of abstention*, which requires that if we are to solve certain problems we have to abstain from studying others, though apparently related problems, and leave these to our colleagues, whether in the same or in some other discipline" (p. 168). Thus the social scientists may disregard the researches and conclusions of other disciplines about aspects of the events he is studying as irrelevant to his problem. He uses instead oversimplified assumptions, which are regarded as unreal and naive by the social scientists concerned with different aspects of reality. This is *deliberate naivety*. We can extend Gluckman's analysis of naivety not only to the interdisciplinary relations at a *macro-level* but also to the relations between micro and macro-analysis. This means that macro-analysis may be *deliberately* naive both with respect to macro-analyses concerned with different aspects of reality and with respect to micro-analyses of the same aspect. The concept of deliberate naivety puts us in a position to meet the "superficiality" and "definitional" objections

<sup>18</sup> This is the recurrent theme in liberal economists (and social scientists in general) criticism of, and/or policy suggestions to, the Rhodesian Government. The Land Apportionment Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act are discussed in Section 3.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. E. Devons and M. Gluckman, "Modes and Consequences of Limiting a Field of Study", in M. Gluckman (ed.), *Closed Systems and Open Minds* (1964).

simultaneously, since the former can now be viewed as a consequence of the latter. The analysis of this paper, and marxist analysis in general, may seem superficial and naive to orthodox social scientists for two reasons: in the first place because, being conducted at the macro-level, is deliberately naive with regard to micro-analysis; secondly, being concerned with models which break through the conventional lines of social science (i.e. with models of type B), it has to adopt, deliberately, a larger number of naive assumptions than is the rule with orthodox research which can benefit from greater traditional specialisation.

These considerations, however, by no means undermine the validity of the analysis from a methodological point of view. This should be obvious if the analysis of the following sections is thought of simply as the empirical testing of an interdisciplinary assumption at the macro-level. Though the political-economic process under examination is not quantitatively measurable so that historical verification rather than statistical verification has to be applied, the method is substantially the same. Given the *a priori* assumption of the interaction between economic base and superstructure what has been attempted is to show that the hypothesis is not inconsistent with empirical observations and therefore cannot be rejected. And this, unfortunately, is all one can do with any kind of assumption proposed by social scientists even if it can be neatly classified within the conventional lines which separate the various disciplines and even if it is formulated at the micro-level.<sup>21</sup>

We may conclude, therefore, that given the existence of certain problems which have to be analysed by interdisciplinary models where economic and extra-economic factors appear as endogenous, and which (because of their theoretical complexity or because of the practical difficulties involved in their empirical investigation at the micro-level)<sup>22</sup> have to be approached by means of macro-analysis, it is necessary to proceed at a high level of abstraction involving many naive assumptions in order to reach non-naive conclusions. The answer to the "definitional" objection is therefore that the analysis of this paper by no means implicitly advocates the elimination of "division of labour"

<sup>21</sup> "Statistical evidence never provides positive proof of the truth of a hypothesis. The essence of statistical testing is that the facts are given a chance to disprove hypotheses, the facts do not prove hypotheses" (F. C. Mills, *Statistical Methods*, 1955). These considerations can obviously be extended to the methods of historical verification employed in this paper. For a discussion and definition of statistical and historical verification see Lange, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-147.

<sup>22</sup> I am here referring to the problem of penetrating what has been called "closed politics" and of distinguishing between rationale and rationalization of a large number of individuals.



among social scientists except for certain problems for which interdisciplinary models (of type B) have greater heuristic value. The answer to the "superficiality" objection is strictly related to the foregoing. If some or many of the assumptions seem naive to orthodox social scientists, this is due to the particular problems investigated.<sup>23</sup> *Deliberate naivety in the assumptions* was however necessary in order to avoid the *unintended naivety* that can be traced in the *conclusions* of "liberal" normative social science.

<sup>23</sup> I cannot obviously meet the possible objection that the problem investigated does not deserve "scientific attention".

## II

THE ECONOMIC BASE OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA  
BEFORE WORLD WAR II

The most important single element which determined the nature of economic and political development in Southern Rhodesia, has been the overestimation at the end of the 19th century of its mineral resources on the part of the British South Africa Company and the persistence of such an overestimation for roughly 15 years. The reasons behind this "faith" are partly traceable in the political interruptions which characterised the early period of colonization (Jameson Raid, "Matabele and Mashona rebellions, Boer War").<sup>1</sup> The costs incurred in the meantime increased the stake of the Company in the country and led to additional heavy development investment (particularly in railways). The overvaluation became apparent when, eventually, the Rhodesian gold fields failed to yield deposits comparable to those of South Africa. For example, even in 1910 against a profit of close to £7 million from the eleven leading Johannesburg gold mines, the ten leading Rhodesian mines yielded a profit of only £614,000.<sup>2</sup> Large-scale workings were uneconomic because the deposits were scattered and the ore itself often of a low quality.

The desire to recover the original heavy outlays induced the Chartered Company to foster the formation of a white rural bourgeoisie which, by developing the country would raise the value of its assets in the area, viz. the railway system, the mine claims, and especially land.

Settlement gathered momentum after 1902 when small workings of mine claims on a royalty basis were extended. "The influx of peoples, European and African, to the mining camps brought about a derivative demand for other products. Between 1901 and 1911 the European population doubled from 11,000 to over 23,000. Farmers began to settle and to feed the growing population and commercial undertakings became established in the growing towns of Salisbury and Bulawayo."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (Oxford, 1959), pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Mantague Yudelman, *Africans on the land* (London, 1964), p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 4.

Thus a cumulative process was started leading to a class structure which crystallized during the depression of the '30s.

Within this class structure the white rural bourgeoisie was the foundation of the capitalist sector of the economy. This bourgeoisie consisted largely of both owner-workers of small and medium sized mines and farmers who were economically committed to the development of the country. This *national* character of the white rural bourgeoisie, even at that time, distinguished Southern Rhodesia from practically all other African colonial territories north of the Limpopo, where exploitation of resources was carried out by large-scale *international* capitalism. In these other countries, where exploitation was based on large-scale mining or plantation or monopoly trade, capitalist interest in the economy were not permanent but lasted until, for example, deposits were exhausted or the raw material was substituted in the industrial process overseas or some more economic source of supply was found.

In inter-war Rhodesia about a third of the Europeans gainfully occupied belonged to the rural bourgeoisie, but to assess the full strength of this class, it is important to take into account the would-be agriculturalists. In fact "even the civil servant, business and professional man, miner or railway employee looked forward to retiring to a plot of land".<sup>4</sup>

International capitalism was represented mainly by the British South Africa Company which, apart from its control over the railways, the bulk of gold production and coal mining, also owned land in part exploited for productive purposes (maize, cattle, citrus, etc). In accordance with its interest in encouraging the growth of the white rural bourgeoisie, it also experimented with new crops. Large estates had also been given to companies and syndicates for certain interests acquired by the British South Africa Company.<sup>5</sup> Other big companies were already dominating asbestos and chrome mining.<sup>6</sup> Control over tobacco production was exercised indirectly through monopsonistic practices by the United Tobacco Company which, in Huggins' view, "was aiming at becoming the country's sole tobacco buyer, and managed to draw the best experts out of the government service".<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Richard Gray, *The Two Nations* (London, 1960), p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> Yudelman, p. 141.

<sup>6</sup> William J. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa* (London, 1961), pp. 119-122 and L. H. Gann and M. Gelfand, *Huggins of Rhodesia* (London, 1964), p. 175.

<sup>7</sup> Gann and Gelfand, p. 72.

A third class consisted of craftsmen engaged in manufacturing, whose activity was totally dependent on the rural bourgeoisie and big international capital, mainly the British South Africa Company. It was typically a petty bourgeoisie and, indeed, the Colony's official Year Book of 1932 does not even mention the manufacturing industry.<sup>8</sup>

Much more significant was the class of white wage-workers formed by artisans, semi-skilled workers, foremen, clerical workers, administrative employees, etc. Demand for their labour was concentrated in mining, transport (mainly railways) and service activities (civil service especially). It is important to notice that, unlike South Africa, or Algeria, their settlement was a *consequence of*, and did not precede, capitalist development in the country. Therefore they had to be attracted by the offer of high wages, and with their skills they brought union organizing abilities. This "phasing" of white settlement and capitalist development is at the root of the absence of "poor-white-ism" in Southern Rhodesia. This class of white wage-worker, together with the white petty bourgeoisie, i.e. handicraftsmen, shopkeepers and small employers in agriculture and mining, already in the pre-war period, constituted the bulk of the European population in Southern Rhodesia.

The Africans were still essentially a class of self-employed rural cultivators. The African wage workers, the African middle-class and petty bourgeoisie<sup>9</sup> were merely appendages of the peasantry rather than independent classes. Land was not a saleable commodity but each adult had rights to its use. The system of cultivation involved a form of land rotation whereby it was used until its fertility was diminished and then abandoned and left to recover until fertility was restored. Within the peasantry some division and hence specialization of labour could be observed.<sup>10</sup> The role of men was to regulate the community's relationship with animals (tending cattle and hunting) and to provide development works such as bush clearance and building huts. The women's role on the other hand consisted of routine tasks: sowing, weeding, threshing, fetching water, preparing food and making beer. Communal

<sup>8</sup> *Report of the Urban Affairs Commission*, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> Middle-class and Bourgeoisie (or capitalist class) are distinguished by the fact that the former consists of white-collar employees or self-employed professional men whereas the latter is formed by employers of labour for the purpose of profit. The members of the petty bourgeoisie are characterised by the fact that, though employers of labour, they themselves provide part of the manual labour.

<sup>10</sup> Yudelman, pp. 12-13, 132-133 and Barber, p. 46.

ties were very strong<sup>11</sup> and when the peasant left to seek wage employment he left his family behind and kept close links (through a flow of goods, cash or occasional labour) with the peasantry to which he belonged and meant to return, even after several years of absence. At the same time the size and number of holdings under cultivation within the rural areas contracted and expanded as the wage labourers left or returned to their wards. Thus, given this security in land tenure, we cannot, strictly speaking, refer to the African wage-workers of the '30s as a proletariat.<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand the African middle class and rural (petty) bourgeoisie were numerically and economically insignificant. For example, by 1930 i.e. before the Land Apportionment Act<sup>13</sup> was introduced, Africans had managed to acquire only 45,000 acres in the open market while Europeans had purchased about 31,000,000 acres.<sup>14</sup> The reasons for the failure of these classes to emerge are a consequence of the class structure itself and therefore they will be dealt with at a later stage.

Summing up what has been said so far we can discern five main classes in pre-war Rhodesia. There were (a) the white rural bourgeoisie operating in mining and agriculture and being national in character; (b) large-scale international capitalism controlling transport (railways) and power (coal) and engaged in primary production and speculation in land; (c) the white wage-workers whose entrance into the economy followed and did not precede the capitalist development of the country; (d) the white petty bourgeoisie operating in all sectors of the economy but especially trade; (e) the African peasantry and wage-earners.

By referring to historical evidence we have singled out a number of classes<sup>15</sup> which seem to have some relevance for the analysis of pre-

<sup>11</sup> See *Report of the Mangwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry* (Salisbury, 1961), pp. 18, 37 in particular.

<sup>12</sup> By proletariat it is here understood the class of modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. This definition is, however, too broad and must be qualified to exclude the middle-class. Such a distinction is unnecessary, and indeed impossible, at a high level of abstraction when labour is defined as a homogenous quantity i.e. as abstract labour. In the present analysis however, this would be an oversimplification preventing the correct assessment of the class structure. The proletariat will therefore include only manual and semi-skilled labour. The distinction has its *rationale* in the fact that the middle class sells its labour in a seller market, or at any rate in conditions less unfavourable to the seller than it is the case for the proletariat.

<sup>13</sup> The Land Apportionment Act is discussed in section III.

<sup>14</sup> Gann and Gelfand, p. 79.

<sup>15</sup> A few methodological remarks about the meaning of classes and related concepts as used in this paper are probably necessary before we proceed. *Classes* are

World War II Rhodesia. In the remaining part of this section we define the pattern of interests which, on *a priori* grounds, can be assumed to characterize the above classes. Whether the members of such classes are aware of their class interests is irrelevant. The evidence for the hypothesis is indirect, i.e. is gathered, as suggested in the introduction, by comparing actual political behaviour when different economic bases are obtaining. If, in future sections, the evidence shows that all or some classes behave *as if* they were class conscious, the hypothesis will have proved its heuristic value.

To assess the class interests of the white rural bourgeoisie, we must consider gains from both production and from appreciation of land values. This double function of land as a factor of production and as an object of speculation, meant that more land was to be appropriated than was needed for productive purposes, i.e. land had to be set aside for both production and speculation. Since the appreciation of land depended to a great extent on the profitability of its productive use, let us focus our attention on this profitability. It essentially involved a continuous expansion of the demand of its produce and of the factors of production entering in combination with it in the productive process. Land was in fact practically in unlimited supply whereas labour and

obtained by classifying the individuals in the social system according to a certain set of qualitative characteristics. The crucial step in the classification process is the choice of the set of qualitative characteristics. Such a set may be arbitrary or chosen according to the criterion of its heuristic value thus differing with the subject of the analysis. Whatever set of classes are obtained it is always possible, through economic analysis, to establish for any set of events or actions (collective or individual) which may take place, the effects on the share and absolute size of the aggregate product accruing to each class taken as a whole. These possible effects make up the *class interests* of the different individuals. Thus defined class interests are mere analytical concepts. In investigating class interests, different results will be obtained (except in the case of static analysis) according to the "time horizon" and the "inter-temporal preferences" attributed to the members of the classes. The members of a class are not assumed to be necessarily aware of their class interests. The degree of awareness is referred to as the *class consciousness* of the individuals in a class.

Thus the analyst, explicitly or implicitly, chooses the set of qualitative characteristics which constitutes the criterion of classification and some assumption about the "inter-temporal preferences". In order to minimise its degree of arbitrariness, the choice has to be made in the light of the empirical context to be analysed so that its heuristic value is maximised. The problem is in a way similar to that of fitting an empirical series with an analytical curve where the choice of the latter (always involving some arbitrariness) is left to the judgement of the econometrician. Unfortunately, in the case of "historical verification" no method (such as the least squares method) has been devised to limit clearly the degree of arbitrariness.

overhead capital<sup>16</sup> were not. The expansion of the demand for the produce of the white agrarian bourgeoisie depended on the growth of the internal market and the reduction of competition (on both internal and export markets) from the peasantry or from a potential African rural bourgeoisie.<sup>17</sup> In fact, given the identity of outlets for African and European agricultural produce, the white agrarian bourgeoisie could not expect the indigenous population to provide an internal market for its production, as it might have been the case if the white bourgeoisie had been a manufacturing or trading class. What it had rather to expect was competition on both internal and external markets. The expansion of the internal market thus implied the development of complementary sectors i.e. sectors which would not compete with, but rather increase the demand for European agricultural produce. Hence the interest of the white agrarian bourgeoisie in the industrialization of the country.

It follows that the expansion of overhead capital mentioned above was needed not only in view of direct cost benefits for agricultural production but also because, by fostering industrialization it would have indirectly stimulated demand for agricultural produce. In this respect therefore, the interests of the white rural bourgeoisie lay in an expansionary policy preceding and not following economic development.

Turning now to labour supply there were essentially three ways in which it could be expanded: (a) through a system of forced labour; (b) by lowering the opportunity cost of the peasantry i.e. by progressively reducing its overall productivity; and (c) by means of the proletarianization of the peasants. Alternative (c) however, runs against the other interest in limiting competition from Africans, since the proletarianization of the peasantry would bring about the emergence of a black agrarian bourgeoisie bound to compete on the markets of produce and of factors of production. Probably more important is the consideration that by preserving the traditional system of land tenure wages could be kept lower in the long run, since part of the real cost of the means for the subsistence of the migrant workers' families would be borne by the peasantry.

<sup>16</sup> By overhead capital will be understood such basic economic facilities as transport and communications, water, power, marketing facilities and (stretching the definition a little) heavy industry.

<sup>17</sup> The conditions of demand on the export markets as opposed to the sales on such markets (which depend also on the supply conditions within the system) were (and are) exogenous to the system and as such irrelevant to our present purpose.

I have dwelt on the interests of the white agrarian bourgeoisie because, as mentioned earlier, the Rhodesian pre-war capitalist economy was geared around this class. The discussion of the interest of other classes has thus been simplified. International capitalism, and within its fold the Chartered Company in particular, had to rely on the development of a national white bourgeoisie in order to recover its initial investment in the territory. Hence the interests of these two classes basically coincided. Nevertheless with regard to mining activities the coincidence of interests was limited to the necessity of expanding the overall labour supply. In fact, a too rapid growth of the national bourgeoisie through industrialization might have endangered the supplies of African labour (also and especially from neighbouring territories) required by operations outside the country i.e. South Africa, Katanga and later Zambia. This represents the inconsistency inherent in the relations between international and national capitalism in pre-World War II Rhodesia. The speculative interests of the former implied the expansion of the latter but such an expansion might have threatened its more important productive interests.

A more manifest conflict of interests was centred around investment in overhead capital. As we saw the national bourgeoisie had an interest in the expansion of overhead capital to foster the economic development of the country. On the other hand, the British South African Company, which controlled the railways and power, had an interest in restrictive policies i.e. in increasing investment in response to, and not to induce, greater demand. This is the well known shortcoming of private enterprise whose investment decisions taken individually tend to follow market-demand rather than lead it, while market demand itself depends largely on aggregate investment decisions. When the capitalist system is highly competitive, or using a Keynesian expression, when the entrepreneurs' "animal spirits" are very high, the situation is different because investment is almost entirely autonomous i.e. does not depend on demand. But if capitalist production is highly concentrated, as in the case under discussion, the "animal spirits" are likely to be very low and investment is almost wholly induced. Hence the conflict of interests between the British South Africa Company and the national bourgeoisie.

The white wage-workers were employed mainly in service activities and big mining companies. Since their settlement followed and did not precede local capitalist development, they enjoyed wage premiums over South Africa and consequently United Kingdom wage levels. In fact,

given the lack of a stable African urban population and of adequate Government expenditure on African primary education, it was in all likelihood cheaper for the private employers to import skilled and semi-skilled workers than to train local African labour for skilled positions. In other words, the white working class had not emerged out of a local dispossessed class (like the poor-whites in South Africa) but came to fill specific jobs so that no "reserve army of white labour" existed in the country. There were two implications: a very strong bargaining power of the white workers *vis a vis* their employers; and, in the second place, white workers could be organized effectively. Bearing this in mind, the class interests of white wage workers are easily identified. They consisted of making use of their strength to obtain economic concessions from the employers, and to perpetuate those conditions on which their strength was based i.e. the lack of (a) a reserve army of white labour, (b) a stable urban African population and, above all, (c) an effective educational and training system for the Africans. We may thus assume a conflict of interests between this class and international capitalism (its main employer) which has an interest in resisting economic concessions and in fostering greater competition on the market of those skills it employs.

No such conflict existed between the white working class and the national bourgeoisie which was a minor employer of white labour. Rather, the interests of these two classes coincided on the issue of industrialization since development would bring greater opportunities of employment and thus strengthened further its bargaining power. Similar were the main class interests of the white petty bourgeoisie (whatever its branch of activity) which can be summed up in (a) limitations on actual and potential African competition and (b) growth of the domestic market.

We are thus left with the mass of the Africans. In the first place their interests lay in being drawn into the money economy not because of decreasing productivity in the traditional system but rather because of increasing productivity which would have strengthened their bargaining power. In fact the wage rates to be paid in the capitalist sector to labour outflowing the traditional sector is a function, among other things, of the opportunity cost of the peasant in the latter sector. That is the greater the opportunities for earning a living outside the capitalist sector the higher must be wage rates in order to attract labour. A first conflict can thus be assumed between the peasantry (wage-workers included) and white capitalists be they national or international in char-

acter. Such a conflict was reinforced in the case of the agrarian bourgeoisie which not only was the employer of African migrant labour but also competed on the markets with peasant produce.

A similar conflict existed with the white workers and petty bourgeoisie. To the interest of these classes in limiting racial competition corresponded that of the Africans in eliminating those conditions on which differentials in the standard of living were based. It can thus be assumed that in this particular respect there was a coincidence of the interests of the Africans and international capitalism since both would benefit from greater racial competition in the skilled labour market.

## III

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRE-WORLD WAR II  
ECONOMIC BASE

In this section we analyse the ideologies, struggle for political power and the institutional framework of pre-World War II Rhodesia connecting them to the class structure outlined above. In other words we try to relate the *superstructure* to the economic base of the social system. The key to understanding the outcome of the struggle for political power in the period under discussion, is the different degree of class consciousness, i.e. awareness of their class interests, displayed by the various classes mentioned in the previous section. While the classes within the European section of the population were characterized by a remarkable degree of class consciousness, particularly in periods of economic depression, the Africans were not. In a scattered peasantry whose economic conditions had not yet notably worsened, and still using the traditional mode of production based on kinship relations, rather than impersonal market relations, class loyalty could not possibly substitute tribal loyalty. "In Mashonaland . . . the small and broken tribes, scattered and restricted to their separate and distant reserves, were prevented from developing any cohesion or a wider outlook, while in Matabeleland the only rallying point of national feeling – the family of Lobengula – was becoming . . . more a family and sentimental affair than a national aspiration." At the same time the wage workers still belonged to the peasantry and furthermore their incessant movements "from job to job, from location to kraal, from the Protectorates to the Union" prevented them from "developing, as a community, any corporate independence, initiative and self-respect".<sup>1</sup> It is true that protest movements were already appearing in the '20s but either they were concerned with the status of the negligible nucleus of educated Africans or they were vague and ill-directed and disappeared as soon as they were faced by official repression.<sup>2</sup> In consequence the African masses

<sup>1</sup> Gray, pp. 159, 269.

<sup>2</sup> Gray, pp. 160-168; see also J. van Velsen, "Trends in African Nationalism in

were politically inert, passive and hence virtually powerless. The only signs of a class struggle were therefore to be seen within the European section of the population. The rather mild character of such a struggle can be ascribed precisely to the political inertia and passiveness of the large majority of the population which created the possibility of a deal between the different interests of the white classes.

Bearing this in mind the obvious implication of the class structure sketched above was to be a coalition of all white classes, national in character (i.e. rural bourgeoisie, wage-workers and petty bourgeoisie, whose interests were compatible, if not identical) in opposition to international capitalism; the conflict being mainly focused on the issues of overhead capital expansion and of monopsonistic practices. This assumption is corroborated by historical evidence. Two stages of political evolution can be discerned. At first the community of interests of the Chartered Company and the rural bourgeoisie materialized in an ambitious programme of investment and in legislation aimed at obtaining labour from the indigenous population. The latter included (a) the expropriation of land while encouraging the dispossessed peasantry to remain where they were as tenants, their rent being commuted for labour; (b) a hut tax which virtually compelled the adult African males to spend between one and three months a year in wage-employment, and (c) a Pass Law intended to direct labour where it was wanted.<sup>3</sup> Thus of the three ways, mentioned earlier, in which the supply of labour could be expanded, "forced labour" was the one relied upon at this stage.

With World War I the economic power of the national bourgeoisie and white wage-workers *vis a vis* international capitalism had grown stronger since hostilities and their aftermath occasioned a widespread shortage of skilled white labour and of world supplies of raw materials. This relative strength lasted throughout the '20s and by the time the depression of the '30s had set in, the coalition of the white national classes had managed to obtain a good share of political power. A decisive step toward greater national control was the achievement of responsible government as opposed to amalgamation with the Union of South Africa. This latter course was, according to Gann and Gelfand, favoured by international capitalism because of the reliability of Smuts as an upholder of Imperial interests. The high degree of class con-

Southern Rhodesia", *Kroniek van Afrika* (Universitaire Pers, Leiden), June 1964.

<sup>3</sup> Leys, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.



sciousness displayed by all white classes and the connection between economic structure and the political decision on responsible government is well illustrated in the following passage:<sup>4</sup> "The Chartered Company strongly favoured this course of action . . . monied men distrusted the backveld farmer and 'bush lawyers' within the ranks of the Responsible Government Association, and dreaded the idea of a *semi-bankrupt settlers' government at Salisbury, which might tamper with mining and railway investments, or put up local taxes to finance lavish public expenditure and provide jobs for pals. . . . A new access of English-speaking voters would help to keep the General in power and the Union within the Imperial orbit . . . Many farmers feared that association with the Union might be instrumental in depriving them of their African labourers, who preferred the higher wages offered by the gold-mining industry of the Rand. Many Rhodesians argued that union might lead to the influx of poor whites from the South, or that Pretoria might neglect the country's general economic well-being*" (My italics<sup>5</sup> G. A.).

Responsible government merely meant a greater share of power for the national white classes and by no means their undisputed rule. Economic dependence on foreign capital instead forced the settler's government to adopt middle of the road policies compromising between the interests of the national bourgeoisie and white workers on the one hand and of international capitalism on the other. The result was that these conflicts fell into the background and that greater national control over legislative power found expression in an institutional framework, strongly biased in favour of the interests of white national classes, which would regulate future class relations. This is reflected in the legislation passed before World War II (especially in the '30s when the depression stiffened the class consciousness of the white classes) to regulate the supply of labour, the reservation of produce markets and government expenditure, monopsonistic practices and the expansion of overhead capital.

With regard to the last named item, though the railway system and coal supply remained under the control of the British South Africa Company, the Government took important steps in other spheres to provide basic facilities for the economic development of the country in line with the class interests of the national bourgeoisie and white

<sup>4</sup> Gann and Gelfand, pp. 59-60.

<sup>5</sup> The italics stress the conflict of interests centred upon overhead capital expansion, competition for labour supplies, and interracial competition (see Section II).

workers. Government intervention increased remarkably and moved in two directions: expansion of overhead capital and strengthening of the bargaining power of the national bourgeoisie on the raw materials market. Public works, especially in road building, were carried out on a large scale; several state enterprises were founded in the '30s and early '40s including the Electricity Supply Commission power stations, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission foundries and mills, and the Cotton Industry Board mills. Raw materials processing plants (e.g. a roasting plant for processing low grade ores and the establishment of a Sugar Industry Board) and marketing organisations were also set up. A side effect of these developments was a reduced economic dependence on international monopolistic interests. More direct steps were however taken to strengthen the bargaining power of the white farmers *vis a vis* the United Tobacco Company.<sup>6</sup> Through the Tobacco Marketing Act (1936) by limiting competition among growers, it was attempted to replace a monopsonistic market with a kind of bilateral monopoly. Whether the attempt was successful is a different matter and in this respect it is interesting to notice that in 1943, seven years after the implementation of the act, the Southern Rhodesian Finance Minister still maintained that the price of leaf was controlled by powerful interests outside the Colony.<sup>7</sup>

More significant was the legislation passed to ensure an expanding supply of labour and to divide the economy into non-competing racial groups. This was achieved by a series of legislative measures and finally by the Land Apportionment Act. This Act put a definite limit to the land available for African permanent settlement and in consequence made necessary the transformation of the traditional system of cultivation from shifting to continuous cultivation. The change was also encouraged by the Government which "centralized" the African rural areas i.e. divided them up into permanent arable and permanent grazing land. Given the techniques employed by the peasantry and the type of soil allocated to them, the implication of the transformation from shifting to continuous cultivation was progressive soil erosion<sup>8</sup> and thus decreasing productivity of African land. However, since the criteria employed for allocating land to Africans was an average acre-

<sup>6</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>7</sup> Gann and Gelfand, pp. 175-176.

<sup>8</sup> For the effects of continuous cultivation over African agriculture, see Ken Brown, *Land in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1959), pp. 6-10 and also Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, *Second Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives* (Salisbury, 1960).

age per family rather than income of that acreage,<sup>9</sup> the progressive decreases in the productivity of land was tantamount to a progressive decrease in the overall productivity of the peasantry. Thus a built-in trend of decreasing productivity of the peasantry was established which would ensure an expanding supply of labour. Apart from these long-term implications the Land Apportionment Act provided the European farmers with a pool of labour to start with. This was achieved by allowing a European farmer to enter an agreement "whereupon a native or his family shall be permitted to occupy a portion of such land under condition that he supply labour to such owner or occupier". Similarly the hut tax guaranteed a steady flow of labour from the tribal areas. Furthermore as time went by and contacts with the money economy increased, new needs were felt (especially for education and clothes) altering the level of subsistence.<sup>10</sup> In consequence the demand for cash was itself growing and, given the limitations on the production of cash crops (to be discussed presently), a further element was at work to expand labour supply.

The distribution of the total African labour supply between the different capitalist sectors on the other hand, was not mainly left to the law of supply and demand but was also legislated for mainly through the Native Registration Act (1936). This Act tightened up the Pass Law and effectively contributed to the maintenance of a wage structure whereby the white farmers constantly paid unskilled labour lower wage rates than other employers.<sup>11</sup>

The second implication of land apportionment was the division of the economy into noncompeting racial groups. As we saw earlier racial competition could take place between (a) white agrarian bourgeoisie and African peasantry; (b) white and black bourgeoisie in both the produce and the labour market; (c) white and black petty bourgeoisie in retail trade and (d) white and black wage-workers in the skilled labour market.

In restricting competition in these markets the Land apportionment

<sup>9</sup> Yudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>10</sup> It is therefore assumed that a historical and social element (besides a physical element) enters into the determination of what is socially accepted as subsistence income and consumption. For a discussion of the meaning of "Subsistence" see M. Dobb, *Wages* (1953), chapter IV, para 3-5.

<sup>11</sup> Recruitment of labour outside Southern Rhodesia was certainly one of the major factors in determining both the rise and distribution among sectors of the total African labour force. This fact, however, is neither inconsistent with, nor very relevant to, the arguments of the present paper. For this reason I have almost ignored the admittedly important phenomenon.

Act drew the general lines whereas more specialized legislation tightened the restrictions in the individual spheres.

The competitiveness of the peasantry on the produce markets was restricted in a number of ways. In the first place the Africans were confined to the poorer land resources of the country.<sup>12</sup> Secondly the conversion of part of the peasantry into tenant-labourers inevitably reduced the marketable surplus. Thirdly, the same effect resulted from the decreasing productivity of African agriculture, discussed above. Fourthly, the clear separation of land between Africans and Europeans made it possible to direct capital expenditure in roads, dams, etc. in such a way as to widen the differential in overall productivity of European and African agriculture. These were indirect checks on African competition. At the same time more direct steps were taken in order to discourage African sales through discriminatory price policy (e.g. Maize Control Act of 1931).

Competition from an African rural bourgeoisie was potentially much more dangerous. Its emergence was accordingly prevented or at least contained within well defined limits. This was achieved by preserving the traditional system, whereby land was not a saleable commodity, in the African areas. Native Purchase Areas, where Africans could hold land in individual right, were set aside, but there are a number of facts which explain why the African rural bourgeoisie was bound to remain negligible. A first reason is that land in the Native Purchase Areas was to be allocated by the Government and thus the formation and growth of the African bourgeoisie could be indirectly controlled by the very class which feared its competition.

In the second place the total land to be allocated in this way constituted only eight per cent of the total land area of the country and it was generally located even farther away from markets, railway lines and main roads, than that of the traditional peasantry. Furthermore, though land once allocated was owned individually, there were many limitations on its transferability such as maximum size of holdings and sales to Europeans. Among other things this meant that the extension of credit (which could possibly come only from European sources) to African farmers was hampered and therefore a constant lack of finance was bound to hold back their development. In other words, quite apart

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Advisory Committee on Development of Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia* (The Phillips Report, 1962). References to evidence can also be found in Wolf Roder, "The Division of Land Resources in Southern Rhodesia", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, March 1964. See also Gray, p. 154.



from direct discriminatory practices in granting credit, the preservation of the traditional system of land tenure prevented the consolidation of land-holdings so that administrative difficulties (especially connected with control of credit) made credit extension to Africans impracticable.

Interracial competition was also prevented in trading activities since the Land Apportionment Act, by prohibiting African ownership or lease of premises in the European areas (which included all towns and cities) banished African traders to the poorest markets, implicitly preventing their growth. Furthermore under the Native Registration Act of 1936 mentioned before, even hawkers were restricted to the African locations: only sales of curios, baskets, and similar articles were allowed in the towns whereas sale of such goods as chickens, eggs, butter etc. was prohibited.

The greater political power achieved by the white wage-workers, through their coalition with the national bourgeoisie, also found expression in a number of Acts and policies which aimed both at improving their social and economic conditions, and at perpetuating the scarcity of skills on which their bargaining and political strength was based. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act (1934) and its Amendment of 1937, machinery was set up for settling disputes in practically all industries employing white labour. Agreements between employers and employees in the Industrial Councils were to become legally binding in the industry concerned. The Act explicitly excluded African workers from its definition of employee, but all the same wage rates and conditions of employment negotiated by the Industrial Councils were applicable to skilled white and black workers alike. In practice this meant that Africans were debarred from climbing the industrial ladder since no white employer would have employed an African if, for the same wage, he could obtain a European. Even more significant was the provision which empowered the Industrial Councils to regulate the conditions of apprenticeship. This provision created a situation strikingly similar to the one noted earlier apropos competition between the white and black agrarian bourgeoisies. In other words, also in this sphere remarkable power was given to a white class viz. wage-workers, to control the rise of African competition. Thus the white workers came to control the scarcity of their skills. Such a scarcity was also guaranteed by the Government immigration policy which was, especially in the '30s, highly selective and against any large-scale immigration of whites.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Gann and Gelfand, pp. 124-126.

A third important factor in entrenching white wage-workers differentials over Africans was education policies. While for European children a compulsory Education Act was passed in 1930 and technical and secondary education was provided, for African children education theory and practice harmonized smoothly with the official policies of segregation. Furthermore "the advance of educated Africans into skilled work was vigorously obstructed during this period, and as a result there was a persistent doubt in the mind of both missions and the Native Education Department of the advisability of specialist industrial training".<sup>14</sup> In other words, a scarcity of skills put the white workers in a position where they could restrict the entry of Africans into skilled employment; and this restriction, in turn, worked against the Africans acquiring those scarce skills.

This body of legislation and policies was well summed up in the prevailing ideology of the period: the doctrine of "parallel development" or of the "two-pyramid policy" according to which interracial competition ought to be prevented. I hope that the foregoing discussion has thrown some light on the connection between the economic base of the '30s in Rhodesia and the superstructure which the doctrine of "parallel development" epitomizes. The lack of class consciousness among the mass of Africans, the speculative interests of international capitalism which tied its interests to those of the white national bourgeoisie, the competitive nature of the activities of white and black classes were factors which helped to bring about a coalition of the white national classes interested in (a) industrialization of the country; and (b) the dividing up of the economy in noncompeting racial groups. The next step will be to analyze the economic implications of the institutional framework into which the coalition of white workers and national bourgeoisie has found expression. In other words having shown how the economic base has produced a certain super-structure we now turn to deal with the effects of the superstructure on the economic base.

<sup>14</sup> Gray, p. 138.

## IV

## WAR AND POST-WAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The desire for industrialization and the progressive decrease of the peasant's productivity, implicit in the institutional framework produced by the class structure of the '30s were inconsistent with each other. In fact a necessary condition for industrialization was an expanding internal demand whereas the deterioration of peasant productive capacity inevitably was to lead to the opposite viz. an internal demand, if not stagnant, growing at a negligible rate. In fact a growing population combined with constant per capita income both in the subsistence sector, simply means greater subsistence output rather than expanding aggregate demand for capitalist output. Thus, notwithstanding increased government intervention to foster economic growth, the system lacked an *internal* force sufficient to start industrial development. The result was that in the late '30s, after nearly two decades of self government, the country still had a typically colonial economy with no industrial sector apart from the railway workshop and small firms engaged in wholly subsidiary activities.

There was a second inherent conflict or contradiction implicit in the institutional framework. The preservation of the traditional African system of land tenure was meant to prevent the emergence of a proletariat which, nonetheless was an inevitable consequence of the decreasing productivity of the peasants combined with labour migration. Let us analyze this second "contradiction" in greater detail. At the early stages of labour migration the absence of a large proportion of male Africans in the tribal areas possibly resulted in an increase in the surplus of agricultural produce, available among the peasantry, over and above subsistence consumption.<sup>1</sup> This is confirmed by the observation that

<sup>1</sup> The assumption is a corollary of the division of functions according to sex, existing in the traditional sector. Since the contribution of men to output was, *in the short run*, generally smaller than that of women, their withdrawal reduced consumption much more than it reduced output. The long-term effects are obviously different and are discussed below.

at the turn of the century "workers in mines and in the rapidly developing townships had to be supplied with food. This demand constituted a market which during the first two decades was satisfied almost wholly from African production."<sup>2</sup> The migrant workers, on the other hand, considered themselves part of the peasantry. Hence when they purchased gifts, or provided cash or labour (bearing the costs of transport from the place of work) to the peasantry, they performed a kind of savings (an old age insurance) which gave them a sense of security.<sup>3</sup> The costs incurred in gifts, travel, cash, etc. were in fact the price of keeping in contact with the rural areas where they expected to be supplied with the means of their subsistence when unemployed, or when their working life as migrant labourers had come to an end. This security is the reason why they neither were, nor considered themselves to be proletarians. However, it is not difficult to see the illusionary character of this form of saving since intended (*ex-ante*) saving is not necessarily realised i.e. is not equivalent to "*ex-post*" savings. For the two to be equal, saving must be invested productively so that future productive capacity, in this case of the peasantry, is expanded. However, this could not occur under the system of labour migration since the increased surplus available over and above subsistence consumption was bound to be almost entirely consumed or used unproductively.<sup>4</sup> For one thing there apparently was a Malthusian effect whereby the very availability of a surplus (combined with the introduction of European medical assistance) caused an acceleration in population growth which absorbed part of the surplus itself. The population explosion in turn, combined with the reduction of land available due to European settlement, made the traditional system of shifting cultivation impracticable.<sup>5</sup> The surplus was further reduced by consumption undertaken to satisfy new elementary needs (clothing, schooling, etc.) acquired through exposure to the money economy. However, the crucial factor behind the inability of the peasantry to invest productively the surplus probably was, apart from the traditional outlook of the peasantry, the absence of a large proportion of adult males. As we mentioned earlier, the division of function according to sex, assigned to the men the role of innovators

<sup>2</sup> Roder, p. 51.

<sup>3</sup> Gray, pp. 217-218, 238.

<sup>4</sup> This statement which might seem an oversimplification in view of the fact that the plough was introduced in the period under consideration is qualified below (see footnote 7 of this section).

<sup>5</sup> See G. Kingsley Garbett, "The Land Husbandry Act of Southern Rhodesia", in *African Agrarian Systems*, edited by D. Biebuyck (London, 1963), p. 190.

and of providing development works. Therefore even if in the *short-run*, production did not suffer significantly from their absence, the *long-term* effect was to be an overall decrease in productivity. This trend was presumably reinforced by the fact that, given the absence of males, innovation slowed down at a moment when the transition from shifting to continuous cultivation made a change in techniques all the more necessary.

This long-term decrease in productivity of the peasantry is confirmed by what scanty evidence is available such as that collected by M. Yudelman: "Utilising the available data and adjusting the figures on the basis of the demographic sample survey of 1954, one can say that the *de facto* farm population of African areas rose from 514,000 in 1901 to 1,224,000 in 1950 – an increase of something like 140 per cent at a time when output rose by 140 to 150 per cent and cultivated acreage was extended by 260 to 270 per cent."<sup>6</sup> Thus the per capita subsistence consumption of the peasantry could be maintained only by considerable increases in acreage cultivated per family.<sup>7</sup>

Once this process of deterioration of African Agriculture had started, it became cumulative since the lowered and continuously decreasing opportunity cost of the peasantry in the traditional sector was bound to force an ever growing number of men into wage employment.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Yudelman, p. 237.

<sup>7</sup> The fact that acreage was extended while *per capita* income remained constant justifies, at least to some extent, the assumption (which underlies the analysis of this and previous pages) that the introduction of the plough was a "permissive" rather than a "causal" factor. In other words I have been assuming that the introduction of the plough was a necessary condition for the extension of the acreage under cultivation which, in turn was brought about by the diminishing returns in peasant production. The direction of causation assumed can therefore be outlined as follows: (a) The greater surplus available was not invested productively but was simply absorbed by a temporary rise of consumption above subsistence and an increase in population. (b) The lack of productive investment caused a fall in the long run productivity of the land, so that (c) in order to keep constant the per-capita subsistence output the acreage had to be extended. (d) The introduction of the plough made such an extension possible. The alternative assumption is that the greater available surplus was right away invested in the introduction of the plough in order to extend the acreage cultivated and the output. The long-term result would, however, be the same viz. the per capita income in the traditional sector has remained constant in the long run, population has remarkably increased, and so has the acreage under cultivation (an outcome which, as we have seen, is apparently justified by empirical evidence). The choice of the first alternative is thus simply due to the fact that it shows, in my opinion, greater internal consistency.

<sup>8</sup> The argument is valid, even though the average per capita income in the traditional sector remained constant, for two reasons: (a) the "effort-price" of that constant income increased (extension of the acreage under cultivation). (b) A con-

The foregoing discussion shows that in the long run to the saving of the wage-workers there would necessarily correspond, not an increase, but rather a decrease in the productive capacity of the rural areas. Therefore when the limits of land available had been reached, the attempts on the part of wage labourers to realize their "savings" were to be frustrated, their security would be lost and a proletariat arisen.<sup>9</sup> This is the reason why the institutional framework established in the '30s could not prevent the proletarianization of part of the peasantry.

We may thus draw the conclusion that the economic implications of the institutional framework were (a) economic stagnation and (b) formation of a proletariat.

If economic development occurred the reason must be looked for in "external stimulants" i.e. factors exogenous to the system. Rhodesian economic development will now be outlined very briefly with the sole

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stant average conceals important variations from area to area. Furthermore the process was accelerated by the fact that cattle was the main of the few forms of investment open to Africans, so that the population explosion was accompanied by remarkable increases in the cattle population which worsened pressure on the land.

<sup>9</sup> The argument is admittedly somewhat ambiguous. It could rather similarly be argued that the British capitalist class were unable *simultaneously* all of them to realise their capital assets and hence constituted effectively "a proletariat". I think, however, that the behavioural assumptions, explicitly or implicitly attached to the concepts of capitalist class and proletariat allow for a fairly unambiguous distinction between the two cases. Reference to the "Life-cycle Hypothesis" of Modigliani and Brumberg (cf. "Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function", in Kurihara (ed.), *Post Keynesian Economics* [1955]) may help in clarifying the point. In the case of migrant peasants, savings are due to a desire to arrange their (*subsistence*) consumption so that it is smoothed out over their life span in a satisfactory way. Savings and ex-ante investment occur *with consumption after their working life in view*, i.e. for the migrant peasant, as for the proletariat, saving is a *real postponement* of consumption.

This is not the case for the capitalist class, since its saving (and accumulation) is done *in view of a future stream of profits*. There is no valid reason to assume that their savings are, except in part, a postponement of consumption.

Furthermore, the migrant peasant, when he tries to realize his savings, he is in fact attempting the realization of rights *vis-à-vis* the traditional economy, corresponding to his obligations during his working life (a realization that, it is argued in the text, may be impossible) and not the realization of *real* productive assets as it would be the case for the capitalist class. The idea of the proletarianization of the peasantry does not center on a *hypothetical* simultaneous realization of savings but rather on the assumption that as the rate of inflow of "old" immigrant labourers approaches the rate of outflow of "new" immigrant labourers the traditional economy is less and less in a position to "fulfill" its obligations. The two rates in question are lagged (the lag being determined by the average working life of the migrant-peasants in the capitalist sector), and this explains why the "illusion" of a non-proletarianized peasantry can persist for a long period.

purpose of illustrating the transition from the '30s to the '50s and early '60s. The ensuing changes in the class structure and superstructure will, on the other hand, be dealt with in greater detail.

As we have seen, the lack of internal demand constituted the brake on industrialization and development, and the progressive decrease of overall peasant productivity increasingly worsened such an obstacle. World War II was the external stimulant which more than offset the hindrance and started economic growth in Southern Rhodesia after the stagnation of the '30s. Goods previously imported became practically unavailable thus creating a demand for local industries; chrome and asbestos assumed strategic importance; the world shortage of agricultural produce provided a rapidly growing outlet for farmers' output. More specifically an air training scheme was implemented in the country, in association with the British Government, whereby Southern Rhodesia had to supply air stations, quarters, land and buildings. "The air training scheme proved a major economic boom. Farmers and industrial firms suddenly found an almost insatiable market, and Guest<sup>10</sup> calculated that Imperial expenditure on the scheme alone almost equalled the indirect benefit which the country derived from its entire gold-mining industry."<sup>11</sup> This explosion in demand could have led *merely* to inflation as it did in many other underdeveloped countries. Instead, it was under these circumstances that the *national* character of the white bourgeoisie and white workers which controlled the government became important. Contrary to what happened in the economies of the "enclave" type, controlled by *international* capitalism with no interest in the development of the country, the Government in Southern Rhodesia could intervene both through direct anti-inflationary controls and by setting up actual iron and steel production and cotton spinning plants which made the growth of secondary industry *possible*. Though the shortage of manpower and especially of capital goods prevented the capitalist sector of the economy from taking *full* advantage of the high war demand, it was during this time that overhead capital was developed and resources were being accumulated which could finance future developments.<sup>12</sup> By the end of the war the limitations on the expansion of the internal market (the institutional framework) had not been removed and therefore a slump would have ensued were it not

<sup>10</sup> Guest was the Head of Department of Air, set up in 1940.

<sup>11</sup> Gann and Gelfand, p. 153.

<sup>12</sup> C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, *Economic Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, 1954), p. 20.

for new external stimulants. The world shortage of raw materials which followed the war was accompanied by a dollar shortage. Asbestos and chrome were both dollar-savers and demand for them increased considerably. More important still was the role played by tobacco production which, since the war, was greatly stimulated by the limitation of dollar expenditure by the United Kingdom: the amount of tobacco produced tripled between 1945 and 1958, its value rising fourfold. This remarkable increase in production was accomplished through an increase (in the same period) in the number of producers from just over 1,000 to 2,669,<sup>13</sup> and was the main factor behind the high rate of immigration in the post-war years.<sup>14</sup> The influx of Europeans in turn created demand for goods and services, particularly housing, and the number of Africans in wage employment, rose from 254,000 in 1936 and 377,000 in 1946 to more than 600,000 in 1956 thus keeping up internal demand for manufactured and agricultural products. These effects induced by the increased demand for tobacco and other raw materials account for the permanence of a sustained rate of growth between the end of the war and the late '40s. By then an additional external stimulant came into operation: the outflow of capital from the Union (now Republic) of South Africa and the United Kingdom.<sup>15</sup> In the Union the *national* bourgeoisie and white workers had seized power in 1948 and *international* capitalism, scared by the possibilities of nationalization of means of production in the interests of the new ruling classes, reacted by looking for alternative outlets for its investment. In fact, "the City . . . from about 1947, was increasingly inclined to channel money directly into Rhodesia instead of routing funds via Johannesburg"<sup>16</sup> and "considerable sums formerly earmarked for investment in the Union have been placed in Southern Rhodesia . . . to escape extremist Nationalist policies, or who are hedging against the possibility of later migration under conditions where capital movements might prove more difficult".<sup>17</sup> Southern Rhodesia, with its developed overhead capital, growing industries and European immigration could pro-

<sup>13</sup> Barber, p. 131.

<sup>14</sup> The yearly average of European net immigration which was less than 800 between 1921 and 1946, shot up to more than 7,000 in 1946-1956.

<sup>15</sup> For the reasons for, and characteristics of, the outflow of capital from the United Kingdom see Michael Barrat Brown, *After Imperialism* (London, 1963), ch. 7-8 in particular.

<sup>16</sup> Gann and Gelfand, p. 212.

<sup>17</sup> Leonard Tow, *The Manufacturing Economy of Southern Rhodesia* (mimeographed) (Washington, 1960).

vide the alternative outlet for international capitalism investment. As a matter of fact, foreign investment in Southern Rhodesia which amounted to £13.5 million in 1947, was more than double that amount in 1949 and reached £50.7 million in 1951.<sup>18</sup> This search for an investment outlet was possibly one of the main factors behind the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,<sup>19</sup> which, with a bigger market, large reserves of labour (Malawi) and of finance (Zambia) would have been a more viable unit from an economic point of view. During Federation demand for Southern Rhodesian industrial output was sustained by heavy government expenditure throughout the three territories especially in overhead capital. It has been reckoned that "the public sector's share of Government capital formation ranged from one-third to nearly one-half of the aggregate for the money economy from 1954 to 1958".<sup>20</sup> However, by the late '50s financial difficulties began to be felt in the Government Sector,<sup>21</sup> and disproportions of investment in overhead capital relative to aggregate demand and investment in other sectors, were becoming evident. Already in 1958 the first signs of stagnation appeared when the per capita domestic product declined and so did, the following year, capital formation. External simulants were no longer forthcoming and thus the underlying inconsistencies of the institutional framework which hampered the growth of the internal market, were at last reappearing.

The overall results of this remarkable war and post-war economic development of Rhodesia can be gauged by the fact that the net domestic product at current prices had risen more than ninefold from £27.4 million in 1939 to £251.1 million in 1961, and that fixed capital formation in the period 1946-61 was at a yearly average of more than £50 million.<sup>22</sup> However even more significant changes occurred in the class structure of the economy, which we must now discuss.

<sup>18</sup> Thompson and Woodruff, p. 173.

<sup>19</sup> The formation and the break-up of the Federation could also be viewed as a result of changes in the Rhodesian class structure. However, a discussion of the topic would complicate unnecessarily the argument of this paper.

<sup>20</sup> Barber, p. 149.

<sup>21</sup> W. L. Taylor, "Problems of Economic Development of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", in *Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara*, edited by E. A. G. Robinson (London, 1964).

<sup>22</sup> Source: *National Accounts and Balance of Payments, of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia 1954-1963*, Central Statistical Office (Salisbury, 1964), p. 125; and Thompson and Woodruff, p. 173.

## V

## CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC BASE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

As we saw at the beginning of the foregoing section from 1901 to 1950 the productivity of the peasantry had been constantly declining so that the "effort price" of maintaining a constant subsistence income had been continuously raised. This helps to explain why the volume of African employment continued to expand between 1930 and 1945 notwithstanding the fact that real wages steadily declined.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore the formation of a proletariat, implicit in this trend, was accelerated by the active implementation of the Land Apportionment Act.<sup>2</sup> This active implementation was started as soon as the squatting of the African peasantry on unalienated land encroached upon European cultivation, but especially when more land had to be provided for the post-war white settlement and tobacco cultivation. In 1948 close to 300,000 Africans were either residing on European land or were occupying land within the areas marked for European use,<sup>3</sup> and in the post-war years 85,000 African families were shifted in organized ex-

<sup>1</sup> That real wages have steadily declined is shown by, among others, Barber, pp. 198-211.

<sup>2</sup> A further clarification about the use made of the term "Proletariat" in this paper is probably in order at this stage. The use of the concept must be viewed in the light of the analysis developed in the first part of the foregoing section. As pointed out at different stages most of the African workers in the capitalist sector of the economy preserved a set of rights (including rights of cultivation) and obligations within the traditional economy. According to the definition of footnote 12, section II, it would thus be inappropriate to define African workers, *considered individually*, as proletarians. When we take a macro-approach, however, it can be easily realized that the possibility, for these workers *considered as a whole*, of earning a living outside the capitalist sector is ephemeral: as noticed earlier on, for an increasing number of workers the realization of their *ex-ante* savings is becoming impossible. The above mentioned links between workers in the capitalist sector and peasants, may represent an obstacle to the acquisition of class consciousness by the former, but, from an analytical point of view, it would be misleading not to single out a proletariat as a class objectively distinct from the peasantry (at least in the Rhodesian context).

<sup>3</sup> Yudelman, p. 74.

plusions.<sup>4</sup> This resettlement was accompanied by large de-stocking programmes which curtailed the main form of investment open to Africans.

Declining real wages, deterioration of peasant productivity, restriction of land available for African use, curtailment of African investment combined in making the wage-workers realize not only that their living conditions were constantly worsening but also that their savings were illusory and so was their "old age insurance". Frustration and insecurity ensued and with them the consciousness of being wage-workers for good i.e. of forming a proletariat. "I have grown up under the white people . . . My wish is that . . . we get *better treatment in the way of wages*. Today I am getting older and I have nothing. *I have not saved anything*. I might die and not know how my children are going to manage" (My italics, G. A.).<sup>5</sup> Here the connection between the loss of security and the new interest as a wage-worker and not merely as a migrant peasant, is well epitomized. With the new consciousness came a wave of strikes and political activities in a completely new form and scale.<sup>6</sup> The emergence of a proletariat did not mean that the solidarity between wage-workers and peasants was diminishing. On the contrary the interests of the two classes largely overlapped, the decreasing productivity of the peasantry being at the root of the impoverishment of both classes. Unrest spread from the towns to the rural areas where grievances over destocking and the organized expulsions provided a ready demand for political leadership.<sup>7</sup> This solidarity of interests stemmed also from the fact that the transformation into proletarians was gradual and did not involve *all* wage-workers. In fact when in the early '50s the Government, now pursuing a policy of labour stabilization, tried to implement the Land Husbandry Act,<sup>8</sup> the class consciousness of both peasants and proletarians gathered momentum.<sup>9</sup>

A second major change in the class structure was the emergence of a manufacturing as opposed to a rural capitalist class. The contribution to national income of manufacturing rose from 9 per cent in the late '30s to about 15 per cent in the early '50s to over 18 per cent in the

<sup>4</sup> Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, *Second Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives* (Salisbury, 1960), pp. 13, 51.

<sup>5</sup> Evidence to the Howman Committee (1943) quoted by Gray, p. 226.

<sup>6</sup> Gray, pp. 283-290.

<sup>7</sup> J. van Velsen, pp. 146-147.

<sup>8</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>9</sup> A leader of the African Nationalist movement, Mr. G. Nyandoro, is reported to have said that the Act had become "the best recruiter the African Nationalists ever had". See foreword by Clyde Sanger to: Brown, p. 2.

early '60s. Even more important was the fact that the growth was matched by the concentration of production as the industry passed from the small family-shop stage to the large scale, mechanised, corporate owned factory. As a matter of fact, the proportion of firms whose gross output exceeded £50,000 was more than a third in 1957 but accounted for less than eight per cent in 1938 and "while the typical industrial unit is growing in size, there is also a growing concentration of industrial output in the largest units, as experienced by the fact that 85 firms with gross outputs of £250,000 and over, comprising only 9% of the total number, accounted for 67.8 per cent of the gross value of manufacturing output in the territory".<sup>10</sup>

The labour requirements both qualitative and quantitative of this sector came to differ sharply not only from those of pre-war manufacturing but also of mining and agriculture. With mass production and mechanical aids, complex jobs could be divided into simple operations i.e. new possibilities of substituting relatively unskilled labour for artisans, arose. On the other hand with greater capitalization of production, specialization and hence stability of labour became relatively more important than large supplies of cheap migrant labour. Another aspect was that demand for non-manual labour increased more rapidly than demand for manual labour.

In order to gauge the interests of the manufacturing class, the outlets for its production must also be considered. As we should expect, the bulk of manufacturing has been concentrated on heavy construction materials, processing of local food production, and low quality consumer goods.<sup>11</sup> Production of heavy construction materials was stimulated by large expenditure in overhead capital and housing. As disproportions between overhead capital and other sectors of the economy appeared, the demand for the overall development of the other two manufacturing activities. Production of low quality consumer goods has increasingly come to depend on the *growth of the purchasing power of the African peasants and wage-workers*. Its development can be explained by import substitution, European immigration and the increases in African wage employment, but its long-run prospects are being hampered mainly by the institutional framework which had led to a continuous decrease in the peasantry's productivity. Processing of local farm production was stimulated by the expansion of the European market brought about by post-war immigration and import substitu-

<sup>10</sup> Tow, p. 17.

<sup>11</sup> Barber, pp. 141, 168.



tions. The stabilization of the European population since 1960, (the natural increase had hardly offset net emigration), and especially the low income elasticity of demand for food has been seriously limiting expansion in this field. African food consumption on the other hand "is dominated by the cheapest foodstuffs: mealie meal, low quality meat, dried and fresh fish, bread and sugar, account for roughly 80 per cent of the food outlays of African families".<sup>12</sup> Hence also for this sector the *growth of the purchasing power of the African* and their rapid proletarianization, but especially urbanization, has become a condition for expansion.

Though the emergence of a proletariat and of manufacturing capitalism represent the major changes in the pre-war class structure, important changes *within* mining and agrarian capitalism have also occurred. Three main changes can be observed: the relative decline and increased concentration of the mining industry; the economic strengthening of the agrarian bourgeoisie; the shift of emphasis from the internal to the external market for agricultural produce.

The contribution to national income of mining declined from over 25 per cent in 1938 to about 10 per cent in the early '50s and about 5 per cent in the early '60s. This general trend conceals significant internal variations. Gold output has decreased, mainly "because of the static dollar price of gold in relation to rising cost of production",<sup>13</sup> while production of asbestos, chrome and coal have shown a steady rise since the war. The fact that mining of these three minerals has been dominated by four large firms by itself accounts for the increased concentration of mining in general. Furthermore in gold production the "small-workers" were eliminated by rising mining costs so that the total number of gold workings dropped from over 1750 in 1935 to 700 in 1947 and 300 in 1956. This greater concentration was accompanied by the employment of more modern techniques and greater capitalization which reduced the dependence of the industry on a growing supply of labour.

Opposite trends appeared in European agriculture where the total value of output (at current prices) in 1958 was tenfold that of 1937. As mentioned earlier, war-time production and increased export of tobacco was the decisive factor behind this spectacular increase. Tobacco has become, since the late '40s, Southern Rhodesia's most important single export commodity and therefore a major foreign exchange

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>13</sup> Thompson and Woodruff, p. 154.

earner. Since, as already mentioned, the growth of the tobacco industry was accomplished through an influx of new producers, the number of firms increased.

The other significant change has been the shift from maize to tobacco as the main crop. Two important implications of this change must be made explicit. In the first place the emphasis was shifted from the internal to the external market, thus reducing the agrarian bourgeoisie's dependence on, and interest in, the industrialisation of the country. In the second place, mechanization has been held back by the fact that tobacco growing demands more labour-intensive methods than maize, so that agrarian capitalism remained on the whole more dependent on unskilled labour than mining and manufacturing.

Significant changes have also occurred in the relationships between national and international capitalism in Rhodesia.

Before World War II the main foreign interests were centred around the appreciations of land values, the mineral rights and the railway. The mineral rights were bought by the Government in 1933 and so was the railway line in 1949. On the other hand in the post-war period the interests of international capitalism came to involve practically every sector of the Rhodesian economy, non-agricultural industries in particular. The factors which brought about the change were to a great extent exogenous to the Rhodesian economic system and as such irrelevant to the present analysis. I shall therefore simply try to outline, necessarily in an incomplete way, the different interests traceable in foreign investment in Southern Rhodesia.

Within foreign capitalists three main interests, relevant to our analysis, may be singled out: (a) interests connected with the Anglo American Corporation (AAC); (b) interest in primary production of large-scale foreign companies other than those sub (a); and (c) interests of manufacturing firms.

(a) The interests connected with AAC are centred around four "giant" corporations (Tanganyika Concessions, De Beers, British South Africa Company and AAC itself) which are united by interlocking holdings and directorships.<sup>14</sup> The wealth and power of the group is based on the exploitation of the mineral riches of South Africa, the Zambian Copperbelt and Katanga, and its interests in Rhodesia are subordinated to those of these other areas. It is probably right to assume that the group

<sup>14</sup> See "The Brass Behind the Copper", *Economist*, October 7, 1961, p. 55, and also the more detailed analysis contained in Jean Ziegler, *La Contre-Révolution en Afrique* (Paris, 1963), pp. 33-39, 154, 209-211.

depend neither on British nor South African capitalism but is rather an "independent super-state", an economic empire centred in Southern and Central Africa (this is the reason for dealing with the group separately). Apart from the group's control over the extremely important coal supplies of the country, the Rhodesian economy had offered, particularly since the late '40s, an outlet for investing the profits reaped in Zambia and to a certain extent (and for certain periods) in South Africa. In Rhodesia the group dominates coal and iron pyrites mining, ferro-chrome and cement industries, and together with RST (see below) controls iron and steel production (formerly a Government controlled enterprise) and the Argus Group which has practically the monopoly of the Rhodesian daily press.<sup>15</sup> Other major investments include citrus and sugar estates, forests, clay products, financial houses, etc.

(b) The other "giant companies" engaged in primary production in Southern Rhodesia are not locally (i.e. Southern Africa as a whole) based and therefore their interests in the economy are less diversified and their profits generally flow overseas in a greater proportion. The Rhodesian (now Roan) Selection Trust (RST), mentioned above, is controlled by the American Metal Climax Co.<sup>16</sup> and has no significant mining interests in Southern Rhodesia. The Trust operates on the Copperbelt and its participation with AAC in certain sectors of the economy are subsidiary.

Production of asbestos is dominated by the British company, Turner & Newall which controls approximately 90 per cent of the territory's output, and also dominates the asbestos cement product industry.<sup>17</sup> Other examples of big foreign interests in primary production are Lonrho (gold mining, cattle and ownership of the oil pipe-line) and Forestal Land, Timber and Railways Company, one of the world's largest producers of tanning extracts, which through the subsidiary Rhodesian Wattle Company, owns nearly all of the wattle acreage.<sup>18</sup> When account is taken of the monopolistic practices in the purchase of tobacco, mentioned earlier, the general picture which emerges is one of a highly concentrated and to a great extent foreign controlled primary production sector.

(c) The situation in manufacturing is similar. Well over one-third

<sup>15</sup> Sources: Tow, p. 124; Ziegler, p. 34; Odette Guitard, *Les Rhoderies et le Nyasaland* (Paris, 1964), p. 60.

<sup>16</sup> Economist, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> Tow, p. 50.

<sup>18</sup> *Rhodesia Herald*, 8th July, 1964 and Tow, p. 67.

of the fifty largest British Manufacturers have direct<sup>19</sup> interests (subsidiaries and not merely sales organisation) in Rhodesia. As a result the presence of "giant corporations" can be observed in practically every sector of the Rhodesian manufacturing industry, with a relatively greater concentration of British capital in the first stages of production and South African capital in the other stages (including distribution).<sup>20</sup>

The overall control of foreign interests over the Rhodesian Economy can to a certain extent be gauged by examining the results of a questionnaire sent to companies operating in the Federation in 1960. The results from Southern Rhodesia<sup>21</sup> (which covered over 65 per cent of the total profits earned in the country) show that two-thirds of the total recorded net operating profits, accrued to companies not domestically controlled.

Before we discuss the interests of these different categories of foreign capitalism, let us survey briefly the changes which occurred in the remaining classes.

Economic development in the first place shifted the "centre of gravity" within the *white* community from the petty bourgeoisie to the wage-worker. As a matter of fact the concentration of ownership over mining and manufacturing resulted in the elimination of the craftsmen and "small-workers", which was only partially compensated for by the increased number of shopkeepers.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, wages and general welfare of the white wage-workers have improved considerably since the '30s. This class has become one of the better paid working-classes of the world with average annual earnings well above £1,000 in the late '50s. The main factor behind the trend, has been the high rate of development and capital accumulation maintained in Rhodesia during the war and post-war period, which kept the economy in a perennial state of over-full-employment in the non-manual and skilled-manual occupations. The result was the strong bargaining power of

<sup>19</sup> The proportion of those who have direct *and* indirect interests (through South African subsidiaries) is certainly greater, but not easily ascertainable.

<sup>20</sup> These are the conclusions I have tentatively reached from an examination of the following published material: (a) Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry, *An Outline Survey of Possible Industrial Opportunities in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (Salisbury 1963); (b) Supplement to the Rhodesia Herald of 8th July 1964; (c) Johannesburg Stock Exchange, *The Investors' Financial Directory of Southern Africa*, Part I and II (Johannesburg, 1963); (e) Barrat Brown, ch. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Central Statistical Office, *Report on the Results of the National Income and Balance of Payments Questionnaire sent to Companies operating in the Federation in 1960* (Salisbury, 1961), Table 4.

<sup>22</sup> For the pattern of the European employment in 1951 see C. Leys, p. 81-82.



white workers, which put them in a position not only to obtain economic concessions, but also to resist any infringement, let alone the repeal, of the legislation passed in the '30s. The entrance of Africans into skilled occupations was, consequently, hampered and the African petty bourgeoisie was prevented both by the institutional framework of the '30s and by the characteristics of Rhodesian economic development. The latter was in fact, matched by concentration of production in mining and industry and thus was ill-suited to bring about the rise of an African artisan class. In agriculture on the other hand, though the decreasing importance of maize production reduced the resistance of European farmers to African sales in the home market, the African petty bourgeoisie of the Native Purchase Areas was blocked from taking advantage of the boom in export crops.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore their numerical increase was held back by the Government, the *pretext* being the lack of surveyors.<sup>24</sup>

We may thus say that while the institutional framework of the '30s has been unable to prevent the rise of an African proletariat, it did succeed in preventing the emergence of an African middle class and rural bourgeoisie as a significant economic force. Consequently these two classes were unable to play, as it will be argued, an independent political role. Furthermore the incipient middle class, because of racial discrimination "had practically no opportunities to develop the cultural and material interests which might have distinguished (it) from the mass".<sup>25</sup>

This frustration and their economic insignificance, inevitably led the classes in question to identify themselves with the African proletariat and peasantry rather than the ruling white classes.

I now want to sum up the changes which took place in the class structure attempting to analyse the interests which can be attributed to each class.

In the first place we noticed the rise of an African proletariat and a greater political consciousness in the African population at large. These had many consequences: the pressure for higher wages, better working conditions and greater investment in industrial training and African education increased; opposition to an institutional framework which meant a decreasing productivity of the peasantry, grew stronger; loss of security of land tenure was resisted; etc.

<sup>23</sup> Barber, p. 27.

<sup>24</sup> K. Brown, p. 23-24.

<sup>25</sup> Gray, p. 325.

Secondly we observed the rise of manufacturing capitalism (induced by a series of exogenous "shocks") whose growth was hampered by the decreasing productivity of the African peasantry. Mass production and capitalization of operations of this new sector meant a dwindling demand for unskilled migrant labour and a growing interest in a more stable labour force. The substitution of the traditional system of cultivation by African agrarian capitalism which would bring about both greater productivity of African agriculture and stabilization of the labour force thus suited the interests of manufacturing capitalism. *Greater competition* between African and European agriculture would inevitably follow such a substitution. The greater degree of capitalization also meant that high-level manpower has become important in the cost structure of manufacturing; hence an interest in fostering *competition* between European and African skilled and non-manual labour i.e. an interest in a growing African middle class and consequent weakening of the white workers' bargaining position. At the same time the manufacturing sector of the economy was still dependent on the market of the white Rhodesians. In other words manufacturing capitalism required for its expansion the relative worsening of living conditions of the very classes on which it still heavily depended.

In the third place, we pointed out that the white agrarian bourgeoisie having shifted from maize to tobacco production had lost interest in industrialization and continued to require large supplies of cheap unskilled migrant labour. A fact which further emphasizes the conflict of interests between white manufacturing and white agrarian capitalism.

Fourthly, the diversification and greater penetration of international capitalism in Southern Rhodesia was also discussed. The interests of the giant foreign manufacturing companies overlap with those of manufacturing capitalism in general, described above, but some difference, to be mentioned presently, distinguishes them from the interests of the corresponding national capitalist class.

The big foreign companies engaged in primary production were even less interested in the country's industrialization than the agrarian national bourgeoisie. These big companies are specialized on a world scale in the exploitation of certain raw materials, so that what matters for their expansion is the growth of world demand for their products and this growth does not in any way depend on local development. Since they employ or can easily adopt more modern techniques and greater mechanization their expansion is less dependent on migrant labour than in the case of national agrarian capitalists. The interests of

AAC and related companies, given their "unique" position, lie somewhere between those of the other two categories of international capitalism, namely manufacturers and primary producers.

We should now examine those features which characterize foreign capitalists in general (whatever the nature of their activities) *vis a vis* the national bourgeoisie. Other things being equal, given their financial power, greater capitalization and scale of operations, they are much less vulnerable to local competition. Secondly their size and concentration give them a stronger bargaining position at Government level. Thirdly their common and all-pervading interest is to prevent "nationalist" policies which might tamper with their local operations, irrespective of whether these policies are in favour of a national bourgeoisie, or a racial minority, or the majority of the population.

In this section we also mentioned the changes which occurred with regard to the white petty bourgeoisie and wage workers. Their class interests basically have remained the same, viz. the organisation of their markets into non-competing racial groups. The very opposite is true regarding the interests of the other two classes which we discussed i.e. the African petty bourgeoisie and the African middle class. In fact their growth depends on the opening up of all markets monopolised by the ruling race and high-level manpower market in particular.

The foregoing discussion points to a striking coincidence of class interests between African middle class and African bourgeoisie on the one side and manufacturing capitalism on the other.

Even more evident is the community of interests of the white agrarian and white petty bourgeoisie and wage workers focused on preventing racial competition. On the other hand the interests of foreign capitalism engaged in primary production were drawn nearer to those of the manufacturing class by the emergence of the African proletariat and its external manifestation, which acquired a broader political significance from an exogenous factor, viz. the rise of African nationalism throughout the continent.

## VI

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC BASE<sup>1</sup>

The changes observable in the super-structure which correspond to the altered class structure are epitomized in the shift from the ideology of the "two pyramids" or separate development to one of "racial partnership"; i.e. from non-competing racial groups to the "colour-blind" law of supply and demand. Competition was to concern mainly the African middle-class and bourgeoisie, since peasantry and proletariat were too weak to be able to compete with anybody but among themselves. Furthermore African middle class and bourgeoisie, as we have seen, had interests coincident with those of manufacturing capitalism and therefore their rise was to be fostered as industrialization proceeded.

As early as 1948, at the time of the African strikes, witnessing the emergence of the proletariat, Huggins was led to think that "we shall never do much with these people until we have established a native middle class".<sup>2</sup> Later, in 1952, "*under the pressure of industrialization . . . (he) quite deliberately thought of power in terms of social class, and aimed at a working alliance between the European ruling strata and the more prosperous Africans, bus-owners and master farmers, building contractors and senior employees . . .*"<sup>3</sup> (My italics, G. A.). We can trace two complementary interests underlying these passages: the need of an African middle class and bourgeoisie as a *requirement* for industrialization and as an "insurance against the mass of Africans". As a matter of fact the constant factor noticeable in Government policies during the '50s was the creation of an African middle class and bourgeoisie by inducing more interracial competition.

The institutional framework established in the '30s no longer reflected the underlying class interests and in consequence a series of reforms were attempted by the Government.

<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the means employed by the different classes to exercise control on government policies, can be found in Leys, especially pp. 66-71 and Ch. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Gray, p. 314.

<sup>3</sup> Gann and Gelfand, pp. 224-225.

Since the early '50s, under Huggins but especially Todd<sup>4</sup> and later Whitehead we witness a reversal of policies, whereby all restrictions on competition are increasingly questioned. In 1954 a Bill was introduced by the Government to give recognition to African Trade Unions; the Bill was referred to a Select Committee which after two years recommended an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act so as to include Africans in the definition of employee. Since the recommendation did not discriminate between the voting power of Europeans and sought to make all unions "vertical" (i.e. a single union covering a whole industry), African controlled Unionism could become a possibility.<sup>5</sup>

In African education the "whole emphasis had changed from the slow, steady uplift of the villages . . . to the rapid creation and training of an *elite*";<sup>6</sup> the number of teachers and pupils increased, between 1956 and 1959 by about 10 per cent each year; between '54 and '60 the number of pupils doubled and multiracial University education was introduced.

Similarly, reforms were attempted in order to increase competition between European and African agriculture. In the '50s expenditure on African agriculture increased remarkably. "In the nine years from 1941 to 1949 inclusive, expenditure on agriculture development is estimated to have been close to £2.5 million. In the following nine year period, 1950-58 inclusive, the level of expenditure increased very rapidly, totalling £15.8 million, a six-fold increase over the preceding nine years".<sup>7</sup> Between 1948 and 1958 the first serious effort was made to introduce purely cash crops such as cotton and turkish tobacco;<sup>8</sup> though a differential between the prices paid to Europeans and Africans remained, the lower prices were now paid in order to accumulate funds for the improvement of African agriculture. In 1961 a Select Committee recommended some purchase of European land for African use and the establishment of small unreserved areas where farmers of both races could buy land; and finally, at the congress of the United Federal Party, in October 1962, Whitehead pledged himself to repeal the Land Apportionment Act in case of electoral victory for his party.

<sup>4</sup> It is significant that Mr. G. Todd obtained the premiership with the support of the "Action Group" formed by business and professional men. See Gann and Gelfand, p. 231; Leys, pp. 156, 152.

<sup>5</sup> C. Leys, pp. 116-118. The failure of reforms are discussed at the end of the section.

<sup>6</sup> Gray, p. 207.

<sup>7</sup> Yudelman, p. 159.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

These attempts to *accelerate* the promotion of an African middle class and bourgeoisie were matched by reforms of the electoral system to enfranchise these classes. This enfranchisement had a double purpose; in the first place it aimed at compensating the loss of votes from the white classes whose interests were bound to be encroached upon by the very emergence of the African middle class and bourgeoisie;<sup>9</sup> secondly it aimed at preventing the latter from becoming "agitators" by siding with the peasantry and the proletariat.<sup>10</sup>

Incidentally this "double front" facing the ruling *elite* in the political sphere has its counterpart in the economic structure where the manufacturing interests are incompatible both with those of the white agrarian and petty bourgeoisie and white wage workers and with those of the African proletariat and peasantry.

It remains to examine the political implications of the formation of the African proletariat. The problem which arose was the stabilization of the proletariat because the high rate of labour turnover associated with migratory labour retarded specialization within the manufacturing sector. This stabilization, which as early as 1943 was deemed necessary by "several industrialists"<sup>11</sup> had an urban and a rural aspect. In fact it implied the severing of the ties linking peasantry and proletariat, something which, in turn, had two implications. In the first place a rise in the minimum wages in urban areas and mining locations would become necessary in order to put the workers in a position to support, even at bare subsistence, their families in the towns. However, such a policy ran against the interests of the white agrarian bourgeoisie; in 1943 a senior official of the Native Affairs Department warned the Howman Committee, inquiring into the matter, that if a minimum wage was introduced in the towns "you are bound to have repercussions amongst the farming community and today the farming community rules this country so that flattens out the minimum wage straight away".<sup>12</sup>

The second implication of urban stabilization was that the traditional system of land tenure in the rural areas ought to be abandoned in order to remove the right of free access to land for urban Africans. Also on this point the interests of manufacturing and white agrarian bourgeoisies conflicted. The interests of the former were voiced in the Legislative Assembly by Todd (at the time a Government back bencher); "We do

<sup>9</sup> Leys, p. 225-229.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>11</sup> Gray, p. 277.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 228.

not want native peasants. We want the bulk of them working in the mines and farms and in the European areas and we could absorb them and their families" . . . if 100,000 families moved from the rural areas, "we can begin to cope with what is left . . . and give each family 150 or 200 acres on a ninety-nine-year lease".<sup>13</sup> In other words it was necessary to substitute an African agrarian bourgeoisie and proletariat for the peasantry but the change was bound to bring about greater competition to the European farmers and therefore conflicted with their class interests. The Land Husbandry Act (1951) represents a compromise between these conflicting interests. A money value was attached to *farming rights* which were granted to *all* individuals who were cultivators at the time. *The rights expired on the individual's death and their transferability was limited.* Thus the privilege of free access to land for urban Africans was removed at the same time preventing the growth of an African agrarian bourgeoisie. Nonetheless as manufacturing capitalists grew stronger attempts were made, in the late '50s and early '60s, to enforce a solution more in line with its interests. This was reflected in the efforts, discussed above, to create an African Bourgeoisie.

This wave of "capitalist reforms" failed conspicuously. The amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act, recommended by the Select Committee was not accepted, and the Bill which was finally enacted was much less "revolutionary"; neither were the recommendations of the 1961 Select Committee on Land Apportionment accepted. Though progress was made in African education it fell short of expectations and, particularly, of what was being done for Europeans. In Agriculture more competition between Europeans and Africans had been introduced, but this was done in the less profitable markets.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, though Government expenditure in African agriculture had grown, a dual standard was still applied to the two racial communities.

The ruling United Federal Party lost the December 1962 Election and the "Land Apportionment Act" was therefore never repealed. This electoral defeat of the UFP was itself the consequence of another, possibly the major, failure of the reformist programme, *viz.* the failure to achieve the aims pursued with the enfranchisement of the African middle class and petty bourgeoisie.

At the roots of such a total failure there is a number of inconsisten-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>14</sup> As mentioned earlier African producers were almost completely prevented from taking advantage of the boom in tobacco export.

cies inherent in the reforms themselves. First and foremost there was the fact that the new policies encroached upon the interests of those very classes on which manufacturing capitalism and its political counterpart still heavily relied economically and politically. As a consequence Government actions were continuously hampered by its dependence on the ruling Party's rank and file and on the electorate. Such a dependence explains the abortive nature of the reforms which, in turn, accounts for the failure in encouraging the growth of a sizeable African middle class and bourgeoisie. The frustration which ensued induced these classes, condemned to remain a negligible economic force, to side with the peasantry and the proletariat whose grievances were also fostered by the contradictory policies of the '50s.

A compromise between conflicting interests of the white classes (of manufacturing and agrarian capitalism in particular) was attempted, as in the '30s, at the expense of the Africans. The main example of this compromise is certainly the Land Husbandry Act. Labour stabilization was pursued through the stabilization of the peasantry, but, to guarantee the interests of the white farmers and workers no urban counterpart of the policy (such as guaranteeing the subsistence of the *family* of the workers in the towns) was envisaged. The "deal" which might have been possible in the '30s was bound, in the '50s, to set up reactions on the part of the Africans whose political consciousness had greatly increased. In fact the reaction was such as to make the Government discontinue the implementation of the Act. On the other hand, the resistance to the implementation of the Act strengthened the African nationalist movement which was joined by the African bourgeoisie and middle class frustrated in their growth.<sup>15</sup>

These developments within the African ranks brought about firm acts of suppression on the part of the Government and, at the same time, brought even closer the interests of manufacturing and international capitalism in accelerating the formation of an African middle class and bourgeoisie. When this "acceleration" was attempted in the early '60s, the result was the polarization of white workers, and agrarian and petty bourgeoisies around the reactionary Rhodesian Front Party which obtained power with the elections of December 1962.

Thus the wave of reforms failed because any move in one direction set up reactions at the "right" and at the "left" which made the next move more difficult to implement.

<sup>15</sup> For the political polarization of the '50s in Southern Rhodesia, see Van Velsen, pp. 143-154.

VII  
CONCLUSION

In this article I have tried to show the interaction between economic and political factors i.e. between the economic base and superstructure in Southern Rhodesia. The Marxist hypothesis of their interdependence, as stated in the introduction, seems to perform satisfactorily in fitting the empirical evidence. It is therefore surprising, or not surprising at all if the sociology of the situation is borne in mind, that so little use is made of such categories as "social classes", "super-structure" and "economic base" in interpreting Rhodesia's current political, economic and racial problems. It is the conviction of the writer that a lot of unintended naivety could thus be avoided.

Summing up, we have seen that in the '30s a class structure which had its centre of gravity in a *national* agrarian bourgeoisie found expression in an institutional framework which meant (a) the division of the economy into largely non-competing racial groups, (b) a continuously decreasing productivity of the African peasantry, and (c) Governmental intervention to foster economic development through industrialization.

The framework was internally inconsistent since a dwindling home demand for manufactures could not foster industrialization. It was also "unstable" because of the formation of a proletariat which would alter the class structure.

World War II, the post-war shortage of dollars and the increasing demand for raw materials, the outflow of capital from the United Kingdom and South Africa, and the creation of the Federation, continuously increased exogenous demand. This tendency which could have led merely to inflation was instead exploited by the Government to foster economic growth. Development accelerated the rise of the African proletariat, altered the pattern of foreign investment in the country, and, above all, brought about the emergence of manufacturing capitalism which became the new "centre of gravity" of the class structure.

These changes resulted in strong pressures to remove the institutional framework of the '30s. Greater interracial competition, stabilization of the proletariat and creation of an African middle class constituted the new ideology. A wave of reforms ensued, which failed because they set up "centrifugal reactions" which culminated in the seizure of power by the white workers, the *national* capitalists and petty bourgeoisie, who all rallied around the Rhodesia Front Party. These developments of the '50s and early '60s in Rhodesia were strikingly similar to what happened South of the Limpopo, roughly a decade earlier. "In the Union of South Africa, during the war the Smuts Government took the first steps in leading the country toward a *recognition of the permanence of African urbanization*. The Pass Laws were relaxed by departmental action, Smuts told the South African Institute of Race Relations that segregation had not stopped "in the least" the movement from town and country . . . (Hofmeyr) openly said that the Government regarded segregation as a failure: *the African must now be regarded as living side by side with the Europeans as citizens of a community*. In 1946 Smuts appointed a strong Commission under a liberal judge, Henry Fagan, to undertake a thorough review of the position of the Bantu in industry and the urban areas. The Report of the Commission recommended far-reaching changes, but before it was presented Smuts had fallen from office as a result of the general election of May 1948 . . ."<sup>1</sup> (My italics, G. A.).

The task of drawing a moral is left to the reader.

<sup>1</sup> Gray, pp. 301-302.

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